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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1926 
___________ 
 
GERALD BUSH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MERCY HOSPITAL; (CTT) COMMUNITY TREATMENT TEAM; STEVEN ESIEN, 
Psychiatrist; NATHAN ALEN, APT, Therapist 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-05305) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 25, 2015 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 2, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Gerald Bush, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying a post-judgment motion to file a 
second amended complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 In 2014, Gerald Bush (“Gerald”) filed a civil rights action against Mercy Hospital, 
Community Treatment Team, Psychiatrist Steven Esien, and Therapist Nathan Alen.  
Gerald alleged in his complaint that doctors at Mercy Hospital knew that his brother, 
Gregory Bush (“Gregory”), was dangerous but would not commit him to the hospital.  
Gerald averred that Mercy Hospital and Community Treatment Team wrongfully 
discharged Gregory and that Gregory then set fire to Gerald’s home.  He sought damages 
for violations of his due process rights.   
 The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
for failure to state a claim for relief because the complaint did not establish that the 
defendants were state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court also 
dismissed any state law claims.  The dismissal was without prejudice to Gerald’s filing an 
amended complaint in District Court or a complaint in state court.   
 Gerald filed a response, which was construed as an amended complaint.  Gerald 
alleged, among other things, that Gregory has a mental health condition, that he was in 
the defendants’ care, and that the defendants are state actors based upon their contracts 
with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide medical services to indigent persons.  
Gerald claimed that the defendants violated state law and their duty to protect him.  
 The District Court assumed that the defendants are state actors for purposes of  
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§ 1983, but again concluded that Gerald failed to state a claim for relief.  The District 
Court explained that the failure to protect an individual against private violence is not a 
substantive due process violation.  The District Court also held that certain exceptions to 
this rule did not apply.  The District Court ruled that further amendment of the complaint 
would be futile.  On October 6, 2014, the District Court dismissed Gerald’s federal 
claims with prejudice and his state law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court.  
On March 26, 2015, we affirmed.  See C.A. No. 14-4154. 
 On March 30, 2015, Gerald filed a document in District Court that may be 
construed as a motion to file a second amended complaint.  In support of his due process 
claim, Gerald alleged that the defendants had administered dangerous medication to 
Gregory without warning of the side effects.  Gerald also sought to raise a claim that the 
defendants violated the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r 
(“FNHRA”).  Gerald’s filing was apparently prompted by our decision in his prior 
appeal, in which we noted that these assertions had not been raised below. 
 The District Court denied Gerald’s motion in light of our order affirming its 
decision to dismiss his complaint and to deny leave to amend his federal claims as futile.  
This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  Jang v. Boston Scientific Scimed, 
Inc., 729 F.3d 357, 367 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 We find no error in the District Court’s denial of Gerald’s motion to file a second 
amended complaint.  As a preliminary matter, because Gerald sought to file an amended 
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complaint post-judgment, he was required to file a motion for relief pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  Jang, 729 F.3d at 367-68.  Even if Gerald’s motion is 
construed as a Rule 60(b) motion, see Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 
2002), no relief is due.  Not only did Gerald fail to argue in his earlier appeal that the 
District Court erred in denying him leave to amend, but amendment of the complaint also 
would be futile.  See id. at 209.  As noted in our prior decision, Gerald’s allegations that 
the defendants failed to warn him of the side effects of medication are insufficient to state 
a plausible substantive due process claim.  Gerald also does not state a claim based on the 
FNHRA.  Although we have held that the FNHRA confers rights that can be enforced 
through § 1983, Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs., 570 F.3d 520, 525 (3d Cir. 2009), 
Gerald has not alleged facts demonstrating that the statute is applicable.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
